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CHAPTER 7




In 1994, Nobel Prize– winning physicist Murray Gell- Mann wrote, “Some 
day, for better or for worse … a human being could be wired directly to 
an advanced computer, (not through spoken language or an interface like 
a console), and by means of that computer to one or more other human 
beings. Thoughts and feelings would be completely shared, with none of 
the selectivity or deception that language permits”  (Gell- Mann  1994:24). 
Only two decades later, the scientific literature records the first proofs of 
concept of such brain- to- brain interfaces (Grau et al. 2014; Rao et al. 2014), 
touting a new era in which brains are directly connected and promising 
to “revolutionize how humans communicate and collaborate” (Rao et  al. 
2014:11). This chapter explores some of the assumptions about human 
interaction implicit in this line of research, and juxtaposes them with a 
view of language as the ultimate brain- to- brain interface: an interactive, 
selective, negotiable system that enables individuals with separate bodies 
to achieve joint agency without giving up behavioral flexibility and social 
accountability.
A key step on the way to brain- to- brain interfaces has been the devel-
opment of brain- to- machine interfaces: devices that can be controlled with 
neural activity. The attraction of such interfaces is that they can bypass 
some of the constraints of human bodies, a goal that resonates in popular 
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culture but also offers practical applications, for instance in the form of neu-
rally controlled prosthetic devices that enable paralyzed patients to regain 
limb functions. A more ambitious program is to link such brain- to- machine 
interfaces together to yield brain- to- brain interfaces (Nicolelis 2013). The 
applications, medical or otherwise, are somewhat less clear here, but a com-
monly stated interest is to bypass verbal communication in order to avoid 
its articulatory bottlenecks and expressive limitations (Rao et al. 2014) or 
indeed its possibilities for selectivity and deception (Gell- Mann 1994).
Implicit in these ideals of sidestepping the constraints of bodies and 
language is a narrow view of human agency and communication, and 
a limited recognition of how material and cultural artifacts have long 
extended our minds (Clark and Chalmers 1998). “Can information that 
is available in the brain be transferred directly in the form of the neu-
ral code, bypassing language altogether?” ask Rao et  al. (2014:1). This 
reveals a sender- receiver model of communication in which externaliza-
tion is seen as a mere obstacle to the goal of sharing private processes— 
the possibility that it may provide much- needed filters and calibration 
mechanisms is not considered. Rao et al.’s experiment consists of record-
ing brain activity in one person using electro- encephalography and 
delivering it to another person using a transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion device positioned such that a pulse results in an involuntary upward 
jerk of the hand. The other has no choice, but is controlled by brute force. 
This is communication stripped of any possibilities for negotiating joint 
commitment or shared intentionality (Gilbert 1989). It is akin to push-
ing someone out of the room rather than persuading him or her to leave.
Current conceptions of brain- to- brain interfaces thus appear to be 
more about the involuntary unloading of information than about the co- 
construction of shared understanding, and more about control by brute 
force than about cooperation by consent— all at a loss of individual agency. 
Collaboration, of course, always involves some redistribution of individual 
agency to a larger social unit, creating joint agency. How is this achieved? 
A brain- to- brain interface implements it physically; language does it socially. 
The two need not exclude each other. A goal of this chapter is to put forward 
some insights about human language that may be incorporated in the design 
of ethically responsible brain- to- brain interfaces (Trimper et al. 2014).
LANGUAGE AND HUMAN AGENCY
To understand how language shapes and constrains distributed agency, 
there is no better place to look than its primary ecological niche: everyday 
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conversation. The following fragment was recorded in Ghana, but its anal-
ysis draws on insights that apply to social interaction everywhere (Sacks 
1992). Some family members have just finished processing some newly 
harvested maize and are now preparing to play a board game. A large metal 
tub holding the maize is still in the way, making it hard for others to join 
the game.
Siwu (Neighbours_ 3093575)
1 ((Ben is holding a board game for four; a large metal tub with 
processed maize stands in the way of others joining))
2 Sesi kãrãnpɔ laa puta lò yedza ìyo katɔ̃ mmɔ.
right I’ll lift this and put it in storage there
3 Ben be tè mì puta mì yedza iyo:?
what are you going to put in storage?
4 Sesi àtita
the maize
5 Ben ta mà ba mà su àtitabi wangbe kɔ̃rɔ̃kɔ̃rɔ̃.
this maize will be picked up right away
6 Sesi ã, ma kɛlɛ̀ gu kala
ah, they’re taking it down ((to the lower end of the village))
((some intervening turns omitted))
12 Sesi ɛ ̀h, nyua bò Afua.
uh, wait, Afua
13 Afua ((looks up))
14 Sesi mi mɔɛ gu mɛ̀ si bò su bò sia ngbe.
grab this with me so we put it right here
15 ((1.6 seconds of silence))
16 Sesi bò su bo yedza i kuruɛ nɛ te mi ba mia sɛ ngbe mi pɛ iraɔ̀ ni.
let us put this to the side so you can come and play this thing
17 ((Sesi & Afua lift tub together and place it one meter to the side))
18 Sesi kailɛ.
that’s good.
19 ((people sit down to play the game))
Sesi offers to put away the tub in the storage room. Ben asks for clarifica-
tion, and when Sesi makes clear he refers to the maize, Ben notes that it 
will be taken elsewhere soon. This leads to a slight change of plans. Now 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Sep 16 2016, NEWGEN
acprof-9780190457211.indd   61 /16/20 6   1:07:33 PM
[ 62 ] Language and Agency
62
3C28A.3D1 Template Standardized 05-07-2016 and Last Modified on 16-09-2016
all Sesi needs to do is move the tub to the side. He recruits the help of his 
sibling Afua. Once the obstacle is out of the way, people sit down to play 
the game. Exchanges like this happen all over the world every day— and it 
is in this kind of context that we see some of the most fundamental roles 
of language in social life.
Most importantly, language helps distribute agency. Take Sesi’s request 
for help (lines 12– 18): he addresses Afua by name to secure her attention, 
then produces a first version of the request. When there is no immediate 
uptake, he reformulates his request, adding a reason which turns it from a 
mere practical matter into a joint project that may also benefit her (“let’s 
put this to the side so you can come and play this thing,” line 16). His 
actions show that language provides a systematic organization of linguis-
tic resources to interactively manage the many concerns at play when one 
person asks another to do something. The ultimate effect is that Sesi suc-
ceeds in recruiting Afua’s body as a “tool” for carrying out a joint action. 
This is somewhat like the participants in the Rao et al. (2014) experiment, 
but with the crucial difference that it is jointly negotiated rather than 
achieved by brute force. Two features in particular help language distribute 
agency: its selectivity and its negotiability.
The selectivity of language manifests itself in two ways. First, speakers 
can select the linguistic means for making their ideas public, allowing them 
to foreground or background certain informational or relational concerns. 
To this end, language offers a large and renewable supply of words, expres-
sions, and conversational structures. Sesi can refer to the tub of maize with 
“this” (relying on shared context) or with “the maize” (spelling out the under-
specified reference). He can refer to his sister as “Afua” (highlighting her sta-
tus as an individual) but also include her in the pronoun “us” (highlighting 
her status as part of a joint social unit created in that very moment). This 
selectivity makes language highly efficient by enabling it to be underspeci-
fied when possible, yet specifiable when necessary (Levinson 2000). A sec-
ond sense in which language is selective is that speakers can select what to 
make public and what to keep private. Language provides us with ways to 
control and filter what we share with whom. Perhaps it is this sense of selec-
tivity that Gell- Mann deplored, as it opens up the possibility for deception. 
However, this is easily outweighed by the social benefits: some things are 
better left unsaid. More generally, sharing and withholding information are 
among the most important ways in which we manage our social relation-
ships. The selectivity of public language means that it offers a set of filters 
through which we can efficiently and tactfully connect private worlds.
The other key feature of how language distributes agency is its negotia-
bility: the fact that meaning and mutual understanding are always open to 
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negotiation. Mutual understanding between people is built bit by bit in con-
versation. Every turn at talk is a social action as well as a take on the social 
action implemented by the prior one. So Sesi’s “ah, they’re taking it down” dis-
plays one possible interpretation of Ben’s “this maize will be picked up right 
away” (lines 5– 6) in an instance of the common process of grounding (Clark 
and Brennan 1991). A more explicit case of the negotiation of understand-
ing is Ben’s request for clarification and Sesi’s response to it (lines 3– 4). This 
illustrates “conversational repair,” the machinery that people use to deal with 
small but frequent rifts in mutual understanding (Dingemanse et al. 2015).
Don’t such misunderstandings exemplify the kind of imperfections that 
brain- to- brain interfaces aim to rid us of? To the contrary: it is precisely in 
the tussles of negotiating mutual understanding that language affords a 
great degree of agency. Here, for instance, conversational repair provides 
Ben with a way to have a hand in subtly revising Sesi’s plans without uni-
laterally imposing another course of action. In other instances, repair can 
provide ways to resist something (such as divulging personal information 
or agreeing with another’s statement), empowering people to commit to 
different degrees of participation without rupturing the social fabric (Sacks 
1992). The interactive construction of shared understanding provides peo-
ple at every turn with opportunities for signaling consent or dissent. This 
amounts to a set of checks and balances through which people can calibrate 
and revise the inferences that are constantly made.
People have separate bodies. While brain- to- brain interfaces may some-
what dilute this separateness, language has long bridged it. Never merely 
individuals, we are always part of a wide range of larger social units, some 
fleeting and diffuse (like the 4- second long unit of Sesi and Afua moving 
the tub out of the way, or the more dispersed unit of “readers of this essay”) 
and others more strong and durable (like a close friendship or a kin rela-
tion). Language is the main tool through which we are able to navigate this 
mosaic of social relations, constantly switching frames between “me” and 
the many different senses of “us” (Enfield 2013). Language allows us to 
maintain our individual identity and agency while merging and joining 
forces at other levels.
TOWARD A MORE PRODUCTIVE VIEW OF LANGUAGE 
FOR BRAIN- TO- BRAIN INTERFACES
Current conceptions of brain- to- brain interfaces strive to connect brains 
directly, “bypassing language altogether” (Rao et al. 2014), hoping to bring 
about the complete sharing of thoughts and feelings as Gell- Mann envisioned 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Sep 16 2016, NEWGEN
acprof-9780190457211.indd   63 /16/20 6   1:07:33 PM
[ 64 ] Language and Agency
64
3C28A.3D1 Template Standardized 05-07-2016 and Last Modified on 16-09-2016
it. A recurrent dream in this work is the prospect of a “mind meld,” in which 
a super- network of brains may come to be the substrate for something like 
a meta- consciousness (Nicolelis 2013). From a biological perspective this is 
not novel. Mind melds — or complex networks in which large numbers of 
individual agents together achieve a form of sentience— have independently 
arisen several times in evolution, for instance in eusocial insect societies and 
in cellular slime molds, the latter capable of impressive feats in maze- solving. 
The real challenge for brain- to- brain interfaces is not to achieve some inter-
linking of brains; it is to harness this technology in a way that does not reduce 
human participants to the level of amoeba in a slime mold.
Seen in this light, the selectivity and negotiability of language are not 
bugs, they are features. Thanks to these features of language, we can main-
tain a complex web of social relations by managing what we share with 
whom, and we can join forces in larger social units without indefinitely 
relinquishing individual agency. To throw this into sharper relief, con-
sider what happens when selectivity and negotiability are systematically 
diminished or punished, as in religious indoctrination or interrogation 
under torture. Here, the very defining features of individual agency are 
taken away, and it is no coincidence that we describe such circumstances 
as dehumanizing or inhumane. Language is what makes us human. It is 
not merely a conduit for information. We might try exchanging it for a 
high- throughput physical connection to optimize the flow of some types of 
information— but we would do so at the tremendous cost of throwing away 
a rich infrastructure for organizing social agency.
Could brain- to- brain interfaces be designed in a way that incorporates 
this infrastructure? None of the points made above logically depend on the 
spoken, face- to- face version of language that is its most prevalent form 
today. In fact, language is modality- independent to some degree, as shown 
by the fact that it can be realized wholly visually as in the signed languages 
of the deaf. So it is not inconceivable that there can be some useful form 
of social interaction in the substrate of brain- to- brain interfaces. Whatever 
the modality of communication, the two design features that matter most 
for creating a truly humane form of brain- to- brain interfaces are: (1) selec-
tivity, giving people control over the relation between public words and 
private worlds; and (2) negotiability, giving people systematic opportuni-
ties for calibrating and revising joint commitments.
CONCLUSIONS
The   Hitchhiker’s   Guide   to   the   Galaxy   records the  case  of  the  Belcerebon 
people of Kakrafoon, who were inflicted by a Galactic Tribunal with “that 
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most cruel of social diseases, telepathy” (Adams 2002[1980]:252– 3). It was 
a punishment with unforeseen consequences: “in order to prevent them-
selves broadcasting every slightest thought that crosses their minds … 
they now have to talk very loudly and continuously about the weather, 
their little aches and pains, the match this afternoon, and what a noisy 
place Kakrafoon has suddenly become.” Current conceptions of brain- to- 
brain interfaces appear to be on their way to replicating the fate of the 
Belcerebon people. In contrast, the human condition is enabled by a flex-
ible communication system that saves us from an all too unconstrained 
sharing of private processes while still helping us to cooperate and achieve 
shared goals in ways unmatched anywhere in the animal kingdom.
Brain- to- brain interfaces are often presented as a system for sharing 
information and organizing joint action that is superior to natural lan-
guage. However, directly connecting one individual’s mental life to that 
of another has the effect of robbing both of a great degree of individual 
agency. There may be gains in agency elsewhere, but without the checks 
and balances provided by a system like language, they will likely lie at lev-
els beyond the direct control of the individuals. Language serves as a filter 
between the private and the public, and as an infrastructure for negotiating 
consent and dissent. As research into brain- to- brain interfaces matures, it 
is my hope that it will find ways to incorporate selectivity and negotiability, 
so as to extend human agency in meaningful ways.
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